Volume 66
Issue 1 Dickinson Law Review - Volume 66,
1961-1962
10-1-1961

Artifical Insemination and Legitimacy in Pennsylvania
Sesto E. Vecchi Jr.

Follow this and additional works at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra

Recommended Citation
Sesto E. Vecchi Jr., Artifical Insemination and Legitimacy in Pennsylvania, 66 DICK. L. REV. 1 (1961).
Available at: https://ideas.dickinsonlaw.psu.edu/dlra/vol66/iss1/1

This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Reviews at Dickinson Law IDEAS. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Dickinson Law Review by an authorized editor of Dickinson Law IDEAS. For more
information, please contact lja10@psu.edu.

ARTIFICIAL INSEMINATION AND LEGITIMACY IN
PENNSYLVANIA
BY SESTO E. VECCHI, JR.*
The law under which society is governed is a mirror of what the accumulated opinion of that society is. When it can be said that public opinion
has sufficiently steeled, hopefully legislatures will enact statutes to regulate
and define that thought. However, what must courts do if during this
interregnum the states' legislative bodies have not acted, but problems
do arise requiring statutory solution? The courts are not competent to legislate, so of necessity they must look to existing law and apply it if apposite.
The situation exists in Pennsylvania with regard to the problem of the child
conceived through the process of artificial insemination. Although specific
legislation may, in the future, assuage the existent doubt as to this child's
legal status, the courts are not entirely without direction even now to determine the rights of these children.
The use of this artificial process gives rise to important moral, religious,
psychological, sociological, and ethical questions. Does the process violate
natural law? What have religious bodies said? How valid is the suggestion
that the child remains a continual reminder to the husband of his failure as
a man? Can artificial insemination be equated with adoption where normal
child bearing is seemingly impossible? Is society generally able to accept
the practice as worthy and desirable? Is the fact that the child's pedigree
often is unknown salutary or unimportant?
In addition to these questions, numerous legal problems also exist; for
example, should the law consider that the impregnation of a woman with the
sperm of one other than her husband is adultery?1 Is the person who performs the artificial insemination upon a woman liable for the consequences
if the child is physically unsatisfactory? If so, to what extent does this
liability exist? How careful and thorough should selection of a donor be?
* B.S., Wharton School of Finance and Commerce, University of Pennsylvania,
1954; LL.B., Temple University School of Law, 1961; presently attending University
of Rome, Italy.
1. Hoch v. Hoch, unreported case, Cir. Ct. Cook Co., II1. (1945) ; Russell v.
Russell, [1924] A.C. 687, saying that fecundation ab e.tra by one other than the wife's
husband is adultery; Orford v. Orford, [1921] 49 ONT. L.R. 15, [1921]. 58 D.L.R.
251 (1921), in the dicta of the case the court concluded that surrendering of the reproductive function comes within the definition of adultery.
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Should the donor have any responsibility toward his child after his specimen
has been taken and used ? If so, does this responsibility include support in the
case of the mother's husband's default?2 These inquiries are not mutually
exclusive; they must be thoroughly considered, and the legislatures of the
states must attempt to solve them.
The process of artificial insemination is of two types:
(a) A.I.H., which is the impregnation of the female with the semen of
her husband, and
(b) A.I.D., which is the impregnation of the female with semen from
a third party donor.
It is with A.I.D. that most of the vexing legal problems exist and which
arouses the more vociferous public comment. The context of this article
will be confined to the issue of the legitimacy of a child conceived by A.I.D.
under the present laws of Pennsylvania. This question of legitimacy is
important in that, among other things, it affects the child's right to inherit
from his father whether the father should die intestate or with a will. Unlike
some states,3 the Pennsylvania legislature has never entertained a bill which
would affect the practice of artificial insemination nor answer the consequent
legal questions. In fact, as recently as 1955, even in those states where legislation has been sought, the attempts to enact the bills into law have proven
4

abortive.

CASE LAW

The problem of A.I.D. and A.I.H. has been entertained by the courts in
some jurisdictions. However, as yet there is no substantial body of law
concerning legitimacy sufficiently authoritative to be regarded as reflective of
dominant prevailing legal thought.
In the English case of R.E.L. v. E.L.5 there was a question whether
a marriage had been consummated by cohabitation. Intercourse had never
taken place during the alleged marriage, but the wife had been inseminated
artificially with the semen of her "husband" and pregnancy resulted. In
granting the annulment, the court said that the marriage had not been consummated pursuant to law, and therefore, the child subsequently born was
illegitimate. 6
2. Eckles v. Sharp No. 2, 45 D. & C. 142 (Pa. 1943), indicating that a natural
father may be liable for even his adopted children; Commonwealth v. Friedman, 48
Lack. Jur. 233 (Pa. 1947), distinguishing the Eckles Case.
3. Indiana, Minnesota, New York, Ohio, Virginia, and Wisconsin. See 5 CATHOLIC
U.L. REV. 189 (1954-55).

4. Lo Gatto, Artificial Insemination: I: Legal Aspects, 1 CATHOLIC LAW. 172, 183
(1955).
5. [19491 1 All E.R. 141(p).
6. Parliament subsequently enacted the Matrimonial Causes Act, 1950, 14 Geo.
VI, c. 25, § 9, which stated: "Where a decree of nullity is granted of a voidable marriage,
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In Doornbos v. Doornbos,7 an Illinois court said, in referring to children
conceived by A.I.D., that regardless of the husband's consent, "A child so
conceived is not a child born in wedlock and therefore illegitimate. As such
it is the child of the mother, and the father has no right or interest in said
child." (Emphasis added.) 8
In a New York lower court decision, Strnad v. Strnad5 the issue was
the determination of the visitation rights of the husband of a woman who had
given birth to a child by the use of A.I.D. In granting the visitation rights,
the court noted that the husband of a wife so inseminated was entitled to the
same rights as those of a foster parent. It curiously stated that the child was
"potentially adopted or semi-adopted by the defendant,"' 0 and that the child
was legitimized by marriage; however, not the marriage of the natural
parents but that of the "interested parties."" The court declined comment
on whether the rights of the husband were the same as those of a natural
2
parent, and also refused to consider the property right consequences involved.'
Although these three decisions constitute the totality of case law on the
subject of A.I.D. legitimacy, the general common law concept of an illegitimate
child is fairly well settled. It is usually considered to be a child born out of
wedlock, that is, either conceived through unlawful intercourse and before
a lawful marriage or born after marriage, but where it is impossible that the
husband of the mother was the father.' 3 One might query whether the courts
would apply this general proposition in the case of an A.I.D. birth;14 but
this concept of legitimacy would not seem to be tortured where conception
occurs through the use of A.I.D.
PROOF OF ILLEGITIMACY

Despite this question of precise legal delineation, "illegitimacy" is a
matter which is difficult of proof. This is especially true where the child
is born to a married woman and where such woman is living with her husband as is the usual case where artificial insemination by the donor has been
any child who would have been the legitimate child of the parties to the marriage if it
had been dissolved, instead of being annulled, at the date of the decree shall be deemed
to be their legitimate child notwithstanding the annulment." See also Rice, A.I.D.-An
Heir of Controversy, 34 NOTRE DAME LAW. 510 (1958-59). It is believed that England
will not make legitimate, as a matter of right, children conceived through A.I.D.
7. No. 54 S. 14981, Super. Ct., Cook Co. Ill.,
Dec. 13, 1954.
8. Quoted from the decision as taken from Tallin, Artificial Insemination, 34 CAN.
B. REV. 1, 15 (1956). See also Bartholomew, Legal Implications of Artificial Insemination, 21 MODERN L. REV. 236.
9. 190 Misc. 786, 78 N.Y.S.2d 390 (1948).
10. Id. at -, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 391.
11. Id. at -, 78 N.Y.S.2d at 392. This is unusual, considering the nature of New
York's Adoption Laws. N.Y. DOMESTIC RELATIONS LAWS § 110.
12. Ibid.
13. 5 P.L.E., Bastards § 1 (1958).
14. Note, 46 DICK. L. REV. 271, 278 (1942).
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utilized. In addition, there are certain evidentiary rules available which may
be employed.
Blood Grouping Tests
In the case of an unmarried mother, defeating an allegation of a child's
paternity is not as difficult for the defendant as when the mother is married.
To aid such a defendant, Pennsylvania has adopted an evidentiary statute
allowing blood grouping tests. This enactment provides that where there
is a proceeding to establish paternity:
The court, on motion of the defendant, shall order the mother, her
child and the defendant to submit to one or more blood grouping
tests by a duly qualified physician to determine whether or not the
defendant can be excluded as being the father of the child, and the
results of such tests may be received in evidence but only in cases
where definite exclusion of the defendant is established. 15
This provision was recently construed in Commonwealth ex rel. O'Brien v.
O'Brien16 where a husband challenged the Commonwealth's contention that
he was the father of his wife's child and hence liable for its support. In reliance on the statute, the husband sought to have blood grouping tests ordered, but the court refused saying that the case was not one wherein there
was a "proceeding to establish paternity" as required by the Act. The majority reasoned that where children are born to a married couple living together, paternity is presumed and the invocation of the blood grouping order
would violate the statute, since it seeks to deal not with cases wherein legitimacy is presumed but where it is desired to be established. Mr. Justice
Chidsey in his dissent correctly pointed out that the majority had not said
that the results of blood grouping tests could not be admitted into evidence
but only that the court could not order such tests where the defendant seeks
to prove he is not the father of his wife's child. The presumption of legitimacy
in such cases is strong but not insurmountable. It would seem to be a harsh
rule of law to impose upon one not responsible for the birth of a child the
responsibilities attendant upon fatherhood. The presumption would also
work a hardship by prohibiting an interested party from challenging legitimacy where there has been no actual legitimization by marriage of the
natural parents, when possible, or adoption of the child by his mother's husband.
How may this presumption be overcome so as to permit the true facts to
be brought into court for a fair determination? Since the reliability of blood
grouping tests has been recognized within the Commonwealth, any available
information derived therefrom should be admitted. The writer withholds
15. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 306 (1958).
16. 390 Pa. 551, 136 A.2d 451 (1957).
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comment on whether the tests should also be ordered in the case of a married couple. However, even though a court order could not be obtained,
there may be other ways of acquiring blood test results. A potential source
is the hospital record, since upon the mother's admission for child delivery,
blood tests are usually taken as a precaution against possible future complications. The husband should not have difficulty in obtaining samplings of
the child's blood since he is presumed to be the father until the conclusion
of proceedings establishing otherwise. This being so, he could obtain a
blood test through the aegis of the presumed parent-child relationship. There
are of course other circumstances whereby it is natural for blood tests to
be given and that information recorded?
Pedigree
Another evidentiary rule that may be an aid in discovering a person's
lineage is the exception to the hearsay rule that allows information concerning one's pedigree to be admitted. The Pennsylvania rule allows the admission of a declaration concerning pedigree by one who is now deceased
but who had been related, or was the spouse of one related either to the
family whose relationship is sought to be proved or to the family of one
whose pedigree is in issue.1 'This exception would seem broad enough
to permit admission of facts relevant to an A.I.D. birth.
Physician-PatientPrivilege
Pennsylvania also has a statutory provision which makes information
obtained by a physician from his patient privileged when it would "tend to
blacken the character of the patient."' 9 This provision is construed narrowly.
It is said that "the statutory privilege is so narrow that for all practical
purposes, it is nonexistent. ' 20 By way of illustration: if the information is
obtained by examination and not by communication, then these facts can be
disclosed even if they do tend to blacken the patient's character ;21 and a
physician may be compelled to disclose the names of his patients if this information is relevant to the issue. 22 Therefore, it may be possible to compel
physicians to disclose information regarding the treatment of women who
have been artificially inseminated. There is a possibility also that a physi17. E.g., blood sampling for testing blood types.
18. BROWN, PENNSYLVANIA EVIDENCE 166 (1949). See also Hardy v. State Mutual
Benefit Society, III Pa. Super. 336 (1934), where testimony regarding pedigree was
admitted even through pedigree was only incidentally in issue.
19. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 28, § 328 (1958), which states that a physician or surgeon
may not disclose, in any civil case, information acquired while attending 4 patient in a
professional capacity, which tends to blacken the character of the patient except in civil
cases brought by the patient for damages for personal injuries.
20. BROWN, supra note 18, at 270.
21. Ibid.
22. Ibid.
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cian's information-bearing records may be subpoenaed so that the courts can
discover their contents. Further, since the privilege is meant for the benefit
of the patient, a mother who wishes to establish that the children which she
bore were not those of her husband may waive the privilege and the physician may not complain.
Federal Practice
An investigation of the federal courts' procedure in the admission of
evidence is also necessary since many federally created rights are concerned
with the parentage of children whom the law seeks to protect; as for example
those created by the Social Seurity Act. 23 Rule 43 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure provides that:
All evidence shall be admitted which is admissible under the statutes of the United States, or under the rules of evidence heretofore
applied in the courts of the United States on the hearing of suits
in equity, or under the rules of evidence applied in the courts of
general jurisdiction of the state in which the United States court
is held. (Emphasis added.)

24

Since this rule allows the admission of evidence as it might have been admitted in equity practice, the Chancellor is permitted to admit anything into
evidence or disallow that which he chooses to delete. It would permit a
court to admit any facts which would help determine the ultimate question
of the lineage of a person who claims legitimacy. The federal courts therefore are not constricted by evidentiary rules in their quest for the ascertainment of important facts. Similarly, Rule 43 makes competent to testify those
who were competent to testify in equity practice. This permits a somewhat
freer use of witnesses; but even in equity, there were some restrictions in
-determining who was competent to testify.
The Rule as it is written permits great liberality. However, it should
be noted that the Rule is relatively new and, although growing in acceptance,
all federal courts do not as yet apply it as broadly as possible.
Medical Consideration
In

the administration of artificial insemination,

the attempt of the

-parties is to render the presumption of the child's legitimacy almost absolute.
Although the attempt may be noble, the fact remains that through various
machinations a genuinely illegitimate child is held legitimate. It has been
suggested that the semen of the husband and donor be mixed 25 so that there
is at least some possibility that the child is legitimate, the possibility hope23. The court dealt with this problem in Mayers v. Ewing, 102 F. Supp. 201 (E.D.
Pa. 1952).
24. FED. R. Civ. P. 43(a).
25. Packel, The Hospital and The Patient: Some Current Legal Problems, 27 PA.
-BAR. Ass. Q. 295 (1956).
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fully to be resolved in favor of the husband's virility. A similar recommendation is that on the day in which the wife is inseminated with the semen
of the donor, the couple should have intercourse.2 6 Although these artifices
presumably hurdle legal obstacles, they do not medically render the child a
true offspring of the husband and wife.
It is recognized medically that the male's sperm cells must be not only
active, but sufficiently active to penetrate and fertilize the female ovum.
Hence, a male with active sperm cells may nevertheless be sterile if these cells
are incapable of penetrating the egg. Information regarding the number and
activity of such sperm cells, with the guidance of expert medical testimony,
would make more realistic a court and jury determination of the husband's
ability to contribute effectively to the process of procreation. This ability to
weigh pertinent facts allows an assay of information which will permit the
presumption of legitimacy to stand or else to defeat it if from the facts it is
reasoned that the presumption is incorrect. Whether Pennsylvania will permit the evidence to be proved is discussed more fully below.
Regarding nonaccess, the general rule in Pennsylvania is that "a mother
is incompetent to testify as to nonaccess on the part of her lawful husband
if the result of such testimony would be to bastardize her children. ' 27 There
are two important aspects of this statement. If the case law is followed today,
then the limitation is (1) as to the mother's competency to testify and (2)
solely to the nonaccess. 2 The general rule, however, does not prohibit the
wife's testimony as to the criminal connection with one who is the alleged
father,' 9 anyone else's testimony as to nonaccess,30 or, in fact in some instances, the wife's testimony as to her husband's nonaccess is not held to
3
be reversible error. '
26. Interview with the late Edmond J. Farris, Ph.D., Director of the Farris Institute of Parenthood, Jan. 25, 1961.

27. Schumacher's Estate, 41 D. & C. 100 (Pa. 1941). Pennsylvania also has a

statute concerning a specific adulterous union which provides: "The husband or wife,
who shall have been guilty of the crime of adultery, shall not marry the person with

whom the said crime was committed during the life of the former wife or husband; but

nothing herein contained shall be construed to extend to or affect or render illegitimate
any children born of the body of the wife during coverture." PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 48,
§ 169 (1930).

It will be noted that this section refers to the circumstances wherein a spouse is

guilty of adultery and marriage to the corespondent is attempted. Children of that union
are not rendered illegitimate solely because the father is statutorily prohibited from
marrying the child's mother. This section has reference only to such circumstances and
is not all-pervasive. See also Warrenberger v. Folsom, 239 F.2d 846 (3d Cir. 1956),
discussing this section with respect to Social Security rights.
28. Nonaccess is defined as the "Absence of opportunities for sexual intercourse
between husband and wife; or the absence of such intercourse." BLACK, LAw DicTIONARY (4th ed. 1951).
29. Commonwealth v. Barone, 164 Pa. Super. 73, 63 A.2d 132 (1949) ; Common-

wealth v. Levandowski, 134 Pa. Super. 477, 4 A.2d 201 (1939).
30.
31.

Ibid.
Commonwealth v. Boyer, 168 Pa. Super. 16, 76 A.2d 230 (1950).
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Nonaccess refers specifically to sexual intercourse and not to the
inability of the husband to produce a sufficient number of living and active
sperm cells. However, in commenting upon the general rule of inability of
a wife to testify as to nonaccess, much law has evolved which casts light
upon the presumption of legitimacy that exists in cases where a wife gives
birth to a child. A substantial erosion of the rules of nonaccess and presumption of legitimacy was made by Mr. Justice Cardozo in 1930 when he
said "countervailing evidence may shatter the presumption [of legitimacy]
though the possibility of access is not susceptible of exclusion to the point of
utter demonstration. ' 3 2 Cardozo was astute to distinguish between the possibilities of access and the probabilities of access. This opinion has been cited
with approval in Pennsylvania ;33 and, at least in criminal cases, the testimony
as to the ability of the alleged father to have had sexual relations with the
mother at or near the time when it was thought that conception had occurred, is admissible whether 34 or not 35 the mother was married at the time

of conception. Pennsylvania also allows the admission of medical evidence
as to the period of gestation as an aid in determining whether a woman's
husband was also the father of her child.36 When this is done it is necessary
to weigh medical probabilities as well as possibilities in order to determine
37
whether the alleged father was in fact the natural father.
From the preceding it can be seen that Pennsylvania will investigate
beyond the presumption of legitimacy in cases where nonaccess is a factor.
The court will also look to the medical testimony if such testimony tends to
support or defeat legitimacy and will weigh these probabilities as well as the
possibilities in determining legitimacy. It appears, therefore, that Pennsylvania courts would also rely upon medical evidence to determine whether
from the extent of the husband's virility it is probable that he fathered his
wife's child. It appears that this type of evidence will not be summarily excluded but will be weighed with all other relevant evidence when determining
a child's parentage. In Commonwealth v. Barone38 the court said that:
[The] Commonwealth's [or that of anyone attacking legitimacy] burden was to prove beyond reasonable doubt such facts as would
justify the jury in concluding that the husband of the prosecutrix
[or the child's mother] could not in the course of nature have been
the father of the children ....

Legitimacy is not to be sustained 'by

a sacrifice of probabilities in the futile quest for certainty.' Common
32.
33.
34.
35.
36.
37.
38.

In re Findlay, 253
Commonwealth v.
Commonwealth v.
Commonwealth v.
Supra note 34.
Ibid.
Commonwealth v.

N.Y. 1, -, 170 N.E. 471, 473 (1930).
Becker, 168 Pa. Super. 69, 76 A.2d 657 (1950).
Cicerchia, 177 Pa. Super. 170, 110 A.2d 776 (1955).
Young, 163 Pa. Super. 279, 60 A.2d 831 (1948).
Barone, supra note 29.
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sense and reason are not be shattered in order to uphold the presumption of legitimacy. 9
Birth Records
Another problem raised by the use of artificial insemination is that
concerning the falsification of birth certificates. Pennsylvania has a statute
which requires the entry of the name of the father of the child on the birth
form, but there is no provision for a substitution of the name of the mother's
husband in its stead.4 0 However, since it is desirable that facts relevant to
the artificial process be kept secret, sometimes a person other than the one
performing the insemination delivers the baby so as to insure that the name
of the wife's husband and not the donor's name will be entered upon the
birth certificate. The person delivering the baby must prepare the certificate, 41 but he does not know the method by which the child was conceived
and hence indicates upon the birth certificate the name of the woman's husband as the father of the child. This of course is a false statement of fact
which may in the future work a hardship upon those persons who have a
42
right to rely upon the verity of public records.
Doctor Geoffrey Fisher, former Archbishop of Canterbury, was quoted
as having said "husbands who give their names as fathers of children who
43
were actually sired by donors were [sic] guilty of criminal perjury."
Whether the husband or any party to the process is culpable and liable for
any offense is not a subject of this paper.
Once the birth certificate becomes effective it is very difficult to challenge. In fact, such a record is by statute "prima facie evidence of all matters contained therein" and is admissible in all judicial proceedings. 44 Further, if the record is properly filed the statute provides that:
[It] shall constitute prima facie evidence of its contents, except
that in any proceeding in which paternity is contraverted and which
affects the interests of an alleged father or his successors in interest
no record or part thereof shall constitute prima facie evidence of
39. Commonwealth v. Barone, supra note 29, at 75, 63 A.2d at 134.
40. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 405.204 (Supp. 1960).
41. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 450.401 (Supp. 1960). A certificate of each birth
occurring in this Commonwealth shall be filed with the local registrar .... The certificate shall be prepared, signed and filed by the attending physician or licensed midwife,
except that when there is no attending physician or licensed midwife the certificate shall

be prepared, signed and filed (1) by the father, or (2)
disability or absence, by the mother, or (3)

in the event of his death,

in the event of her death or disability, by

the householder of the premises or superintendent of the institution in which the birth
occurs, or (4) in the event of the absence or disability of all persons heretofore named,

then by such person acquainted with the facts as the local registrar shall designate.
42. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 450.902 (Supp. 1960) makes falsification of records a
misdemeanor.
43. N.Y. Times, March 17, 1949, p. 13, Col. 2.
44. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 35, § 494 (1949).
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paternity unless
the alleged father is the husband of the mother
45
of the child.
These statutes indicate that a birth certificate alone raises a presumption
of legitimacy, and would provide documentary evidence tending to uphold
the presumption that a legitimate child was born to a married couple. But
just as an illegitimate child is not rendered legitimate because of the circumstances under which it was born, neither does a certificate containing false
statements of parenthood render the person described therein legitimate.
It is also required that if a child is born illegitimate, this information
should be contained in the birth certificate; however, the certificate is available for inspection only when there is:
(1) an order of a court of competent jurisdiction specifying the
record sought and holding that such record is necessary for the determination of personal or property rights, or (2) a finding by an
officer of the department designated by the Secretary of Health
that the applicant therefor has attained majority and is not incompetent and is the person to whom the record relates or the mother
or legal representative of the person to whom the record relates,
and further that the information contained in the record is necessary
for the determination of personal or property rights.4
From this it can be seen that an illegitimate child's certificate of birth remains safely undisclosed unless property rights are involved. This provision
is of little effect however, if upon examination of the certificate the illegitimacy of the person is not shown due to a fabrication of fact.
Pennsylvania allows a birth certificate in the case of illegitimates to be
amended by providing that:
Any person born in this Commonwealth (1) whose birth is registered as illegitimate but who is legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his natural parents, or (2) whose parentage is determined
by a court of competent jurisdiction, or (3) who is adopted under
the law of this Commonwealth or of any other state or territory of
the United States of America, or (4) whose name is changed by
order or decree of a court of competent jurisdiction, may request
the department to prepare an amended certificate of birth on the
47
basis of proof of the new status. (Emphasis added.)
This provision also limits the circumstances under which information in
the original certificate may be disclosed since only the person described in
the birth record may request amendment. But it is significant to note that
the statute recognizes that a court may inquire into and determine the true
parentage of a person irrespective of what the unamended birth certificate
45.
46.
47.

PA. STAT. ANN.
PA. STAT. ANN.
PA. STAT. ANN.

tit. 35, § 450.810 (Supp. 1960).
tit. 35, § 450.803 (Supp. 1960).
tit. 35, § 450.603 (Supp. 1960).
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discloses. Thus the presumption of legitimacy, raised from the circumstances surrounding the birth and the information contained in the birth
record, is not irrefutable.
STATUTORY

LAW

Should an A.I.D. conceived child be determined legitimate due to a
failure to prove illegitimacy, no apparent problems exist regarding property
rights. However, assuming illegitimacy can be proven, the rights of such
a child within the Pennsylvania inheritance statutes should be noted.
Intestate Act
Several problems of interpretation are presented by the Intestate Act
of 1947. Section 7(a) provides that "for the purposes of descent by, from
and through an illegitimate, he shall be considered the child of his mother,
but not of his father."' 48 Very explicit in this section is the fact that an
illegitimate cannot even be considered the child of his real father. This being
so then how could the illegitimate possibly be considered the child of his
mother's husband-a person who is not the child's father? Section 7(b)
goes further and allows a person who is born illegitimate to be made legitimate for purposes of inheritance by providing that if:
the parents of a person born illegitimate shall have married each
other, he shall be legitimated for purposes of descent by, from and
through him as if he had been born during the wedlock of his parents. 49 (Emphasis added.)
Initially the question is, when is a child born during the wedlock of his
parents? In Commonwealth v. Shavinsky ° the court said that there is no
case which holds that "a child is born within lawful wedlock when its
mother is married to one other than the proven father of the child." 51 The
phrase "born out of lawful wedlock," when used in the Penal Code,5 2 means
"a child born when his father and mother were not lawfully wed to each
other."5 '
The 1947 Intestate Act did not seek to change the definition of an
illegitimate or alter his rights. It relies upon the inheritance rights of such
child as set out in Section 15 of the Intestate Act of 1917, which provided
that as between an illegitimate child and his maternal ancestors, his rights
are the same as though he had been born in lawful wedlock 5 4 and, as between
48.
49.
50.
51.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.7(a)
PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.7(b)

52.

PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 18, § 4732 (1939)

(1947).
(1947).

174 Pa. Super. 273, 101 A.2d 178 (1953).
Id. at 275, 101 A.2d at 179.
which makes neglect of a child "born

out of wedlock" a misdemeanor.
53. Supra note 50, at 275, 101 A.2d at 179. The emphasis is that of the courts.
54. PA. LAWS 1917, Act. No. 192, § 92.
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an illegitimate child and his brothers and sisters, inheritance is permitted
whether such brothers and sisters be legitimate or illegitimate.55 The intent of
Section 15 was to legitimatize an illegitimate only so far as provided above,
and it was not intended to change the existing law as to the father of an
illegitimate child, the father's heirs, and next of kin. 56
Wills Act
The Wills Act of 1947 does not prohibit an illegitimate from inheriting
property from anyone. However, there are certain obstacles which an illegitimate must overcome. In interpreting a will, the Act provides that where
a devise or bequest is to one described by some relationship to the testator
or another person, the illegitimate is considered "the child of his mother and
not of his father";57 however, when the parents of one born illegitimate
marry each other, he will be considered legitimate. 58 The Commissioner's
comment is to the effect that this provision is new and was inserted to dispel all question as to the rights of an illegitimate. It states that the Wills
Act of 1947 and the Intestate Act of 1947 should be given the same interpretation with respect to illegitimates, i.e., being considered a child of his
mother but not of his father where his parents do not marry each other.
In point of fact, even if the identity of the father were known, this would
not make the child legitimate.5 9 In further clarification, the Wills Act as
enacted in 1947 specifically provided that when the testator refers to someone by relationship and, more specifically, as "child" or "issue," this includes
only those persons entitled to be referred to in that relationship because
they are so related legitimately, or because they have been adopted in accordance with Pennsylvania statute.60 An illegitimate, according to the Act,
can be referred to validly by relation providing that relationship is between
the illegitimate child and his maternal relatives. 61 However, one Pennsylvania case 62 has held that even when a child is referred to as "issue" of his
mother, the presumption is said to be legitimate and not illegitimate issue.
In that case the testatrix left property to the "issue" of her sister. It was
shown that the expectant was born of the testatrix's sister and of a man who
was not the sister's husband. From this it would seem that an illegitimate
may not inherit through any male's line, and that in the case of wills, a
55. PA. LAWS 1917, Act. No. 192, § 93.
56. PA. LAws 1917, Act. No. 192, § 94.
57. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(7) (Supp. 1960).
58. Ibid.

59. See Commission's Comments to the Wills Act of 1947,

PA. STAT. ANN. tit.

20,

§ 180.14(7) and cases therein cited.

60. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(11) (1950), repealed by PA. LAWS 1956,
Act No. 346, § 2. It would seem that, under PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(6)
(Supp. 1960), the repealed section on this point has been in effect re-enacted.
61. Supra note 57.
62. Estate of Agnes Warm, 24 LEH. L.J. 261 (Pa. 1951).
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reference to the "issue" or "children" of a woman presumably refers to her
legitimate issue. The case rule 63 of Pennsylvania, augmented by statutory
enactment, 64 appears to be that in the absence of a contrary intent appearing
in the will, or from other circumstances, an illegitimate child is not entitled
to share under the description of "children" or "issue."
Estates Act
In the Estates Act of 1947, there is a similar treatment of illegitimates as
in the Wills Act of 1947.65 The comment to Section 14(4) of the Estates
Act says that the interpretation to be given the section is the same as that
which should be given to the co-relative section of the 1947 Wills Act. 6
From the foregoing consideration of the Intestate, Wills and Estates
Acts, it can be seen that a child, born illegitimate and thereafter not legitimatized by the marriage of his parents, is not permitted the statutory
indulgences applicable to his legitimate brothers. The law has reasoned that
a person's legitimate heirs should be favored. For this reason, even though
hardship to illegitimates exist, this does not permit the courts to act without
the sphere of statutory proscription. "[T]his is an age-old problem, and
67
certainly not one on which the Courts should attempt to legislate.
LEGITIMATION

Even though a child is illegitimate, there remain legal methods which
may be employed to correct the defect. Through use of these procedures,
an end may be had to the dilemma of: (1) inserting the husband's name on
the birth record and thereby falsifying it; or, (2) entering either the donor's
name or else that the father's identity is unknown. Legitimation by process
of law would also give the illegitimate child the same property rights and
ability to inherit as one who is born legitimate. Presently, under Pennsylvania practice, two methods of legal legitimation are available to the illegitimate's mother. She may marry the true father or there may be an adoption.
As to the possibility of the mother marrying the true father, the
Intestate, 6s Wills, 69 and Estates Acts 7° provide that as to property rights,
63. Ibid. See also Kemper v. Fort, 219 Pa. 85, 94, 67 Ati. 991, 995 (1907);
Bealafeld v. Slaughenhaupt, 213 Pa. 565, 62 Atil. 1113 (1906); Gierak v. Lehigh and
Wilkes-Barre Coal Co., 101 Pa. Super. 397 (1931).
64.

Supra note 60.

65. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 301.14(4) (1950).
66. The Estates Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20 § 301.14(4) (1950), is the same as
the Wills Act, PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 180.14(7) (1950), except: delete phrase "a
will making a devise or bequest," and insert in its stead, "a conveyance." Similarly
delete phrase "to the testator," and insert in its place, "to the conveyor."

67.
68.
69.
70.

Mayers v. Ewing, 102 F. Supp. 201, 209 (E.D. Pa. 1952).
Supra notes 48, and 49.
Supra note 57.
Supra note 65.
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an illegitimate shall be rendered legitimate upon marriage of the parents
to each other. In the case of artificial insemination this method, although a
legal avenue, is remote, usually undesirable, and seldom possible.
The alternative legal method of giving the illegitimate child all of the
property rights of a legitimate is adoption. The statute provides that one
adopted shall be considered the issue of the adopting parent. 7 1 This resolves
the inheritance problems of the child conceived through artificial insemination,
since upon lawful adoption, a child originally illegitimate becomes entitled
to all of the rights of descent of one born within the lawful wedlock of his
parents.
The final question is that of determining what is legal adoption in
Pennsylvania. Since no common law adoption exists in this state, 72 an
inspection of pertinent statutory law is necessary. As to the consent necessary
for adoption, the statute provides that it may be obtained from "the parents
or remaining parent of the person proposed to be adopted, if such person
shall not have reached the age of eighteen years." In the case of an illegitimate child, the consent of the mother only shall be necessary.73 However,
consent need not be obtained if an abandonment can be proven, i.e., by showing conduct on the part of the parent evincing a settled purpose to forego all
parental duties and relinquish all parental claim to the child. 74 That a donor
has given his specimen without knowledge of the manner in which it will
be used seems to be a sufficient abandonment to facilitate adoption.
After the donor's consent (seemingly not necessary since it arises by
implication) and that of the mother is obtained, the husband may then
75
proceed through process of law to adopt the child.
71. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 20, § 1.8 (1950).
72. Kirby v. Folsom, 238 F.2d 669 (3d Cir. 1957). This case involved the construc-

tion of the word "adopt" in a contract between the natural mother and the adopting
parents. The court, in interpreting the Social Security Act, decided that the expectant

was a "child" within the meaning of the statute. It also ruled that there had been an
adoption within the intended meaning of that word in the contract. Other than the
statement that there is no common law adoption in Pennsylvania, the case is not relevant

because the rights of a child under the Social Security Act are not the same as those
given by Pennsylvania inheritance laws. Furthermore, the court stated that the child

was able to share in the intestate's estate, not because of the adoption, but rather due
to the contract provisions.
73. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 2 (Supp. 1960). Note that in the 1947 amendment,
adoption of an illegitimate was made easier than under the 1941 Act. The words
"unless the father had acknowledged such child" following the phrase "the consent of
the mother only shall be necessary" were dropped.
74. McNutt Appeal, 169 Pa. Super. 641, 84 A.2d 360 (1951). Note that in this
case the abandonment was by the child's natural mother.
75. PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 1, § 4 (Supp. 1960) : "If satisfied that the statements made
in the petition are true, and that the welfare of the person proposed to be adopted will
be promoted by such adoption, and that all the requirements of this act have been
complied with, the court or judge shall make a decree so finding and directing that the
person proposed to be adopted shall have all the rights of a child and heir of such
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CONCLUSION

Children, whose ability to claim legitimacy cannot be impugned, have
always been favored in the laws of inheritance. It is indeed unfortunate that
non-culpable illegitimate persons should be caught in the maelstrom of legal
disfavor. The situation, however, is rendered less tragic when it is possible
to give to these persons the property rights of a legitimate person. The
method is not through devices which make proof of facts difficult if not
impossible, but by the certitude of law which adoption especially provides.
Until the Pennsylvania legislature chooses to deal specifically with
artificial insemination and the legal problems attending it, the courts are
not totally without direction in treating matters regarding the inheritance
rights of these children. Unless the children of the artificial insemination
practice are lawfully legitimatized, they are subject to all of the property
disabilities of an illegitimate.
adopting parent or parents, ...but otherwise shall make a decree refusing the adoption
and dismissing the petition." (Emphasis added.)
It is the court (in Pennsylvania, the Orphans Court) which dictates whether or not
adoption shall be allowed and it is the organ which makes this determination upon a
weighing of the consideration of each adoption case. This function has not been relegated
to individuals acting through self-help in coloring their children with legitimacy.

